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IPE is in need of critical self-reflection. Many or most scholars fail to be per-
suaded by the Open Economy Politics framework, which has informed the 
bulk of IPE research especially in the US since the late 1990s. A key reason 
for the apparent lack of an effective alternative to the positivist approaches 
is that critical IPE has thus far failed to address satisfactorily two key defi-
ciencies from which it has arguably suffered from its very beginning. These 
two deficiencies are the paucity of economic theorisation and lack of philo-
sophical depth. We make four claims: (1) there is a limit to how far IPE can 
go without addressing explicitly the problems of economic theory; (2) the 
mainstream of economics has insulated itself from the concerns of social 
scientific IPE, but there are several economic theoretical traditions from 
which IPE can  draw insights and explanatory hypotheses; (3) systematic 
engagement with different traditions requires an explicit metatheoretical 
framework such as critical scientific realism or pragmatism; and (4) IPE 
should illuminate structures, mechanisms and processes that are not con-
fined by state borders or limited to interactions of national states. It follows 
from (4) that the field should be called World or Global PE rather than IPE.
Keywords: causation; economic theory; epistemological pluralism; expla-
nation; metatheory; methodological globalism; social scientific realism
INTRODUCTION
Claims about trends in a field such as International Political Economy (IPE) are always 
selective and therefore inextricably tied to conflicting normative views about the de-
sirable future of the field. Such claims may concern for instance the popularity of the 
Open Economy Politics (OEP) approach.1  For someone coming from the background of 
1  As the OEP approach is not particularly well known in Europe (Global Political Economy students in 
Helsinki may not even have heard about it), a few words to describe it may be needed. The general con-
tours of this approach were summarized relatively recently by one its key developers David Lake (2009). 
According to him, ‘OEP adopts the assumptions of neoclassical economics and international trade theory’ 
(pp. 224-5). Free trade and market globalisation are assumed to benefit all countries on balance, but still 
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economic liberalism and content to see IPE as a narrow strand complementing main-
stream economics, the OEP framework may also seem to provide a long-needed unify-
ing paradigm that can make cumulative growth of genuine scientific knowledge possi-
ble (Lake, 2009). In contrast, if one shares the original purposes of the founding fathers 
and mothers of IPE, the OEP is bound to appear as a source of major disappointment, 
even if in some ways representative of the ‘American’ approach (Cohen, 2008; Keohane 
2009; Cohen, 2009a, stresses the existence of multiple American approaches). From 
this perspective, the problem is that OEP has drawn attention away from the world 
politico-economic system as a whole. Instead of illuminating real political possibilities 
and alternative opportunities for various actors, it tries to reduce national and interna-
tional politics to apparently pre-existing and often deductively inferred domestic inter-
ests, whether sectoral, functional or purely individual. As a result, ‘research has become 
increasingly insular and introspective, largely detached from what goes on in the real 
world’ (Cohen, 2017, p. 661). 
A critical scholar may concur with Cohen on OEP’s insularity, but perceives also 
deep-seated fragmentation within the field as a whole. Instead of moving towards a con-
sensus on any major topic, the opinions of the IPE scholars appear rather to diverge fur-
ther. Often this divergence seems connected to geo-economic positioning. For example, 
what many but not all American scholars celebrate as US global leadership, and many 
European, British and Canadian scholars question as hegemony of a broadly Gramscian 
type, Asian or African scholars may see merely as a case of (neo)imperialism (Blyth, 
2009, p.4; cf. Cohen’s, 2019, geo-economically sensitive short textbook). Not so straight-
forwardly connected to geo-economic or geo-political positioning, a wide variety of crit-
ical approaches have emerged, variously mixing Marxian, post-structuralist, feminist, 
failing to be in the interests of all domestic actors individually. The main explanandum of this approach 
consists of trade openness or economic openness more generally. Lake explains further that OEP ‘begins 
with individuals, sectors, or factors of production as the units of analysis and derives their interests over 
economic policy from each unit’s position within the international economy’ (p. 225). The derivation of 
their interests is usually based on neoclassical economic theory. However, the theory is not unified in this 
regard: ‘A key divide within the approach is between the Ricardo-Viner or specific factors theory of inter-
national trade, which assumes that, typically, capital and labor are fixed in particular occupations and, 
thus, will tend to have similar interests over economic policy, and the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) 
theory of international trade, which assumes that all factors are mobile across occupations within coun-
tries and, therefore, capital and labor will possess opposing interests.’ (p. 226) A key objective is to ‘test’ 
these different implications. The logic of explanation is atomistic: ‘[OEP] conceives of domestic political 
institutions as mechanisms that aggregate interests (with more or less bias) and structure the bargaining 
of competing societal groups. Finally, it introduces, when necessary, bargaining between states with dif-
ferent interests. Analysis within OEP proceeds from the most micro- to the most macro-level in a linear 
and orderly fashion, reflecting an implicit uni-directional conception of politics as flowing up from indi-
viduals to interstate bargaining.’ (p.225) Lake recognises that this approach may not always be justifiable, 
but views it is a good starting point. The rhetoric of justifying unrealistic and antirealist explanations is 
the same as in neoclassical economics.
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and other such grand frameworks (e.g. Shields, Bruff & Macartney, 2011). This may be 
taken to suggest that the IPE field is, overall, in a state of disarray, raising questions 
about how well organized or homogeneous IPE should be as a discipline.
While the Open Economy Politics (OEP) framework continues to guide much IPE 
research especially in the U.S. (see e.g. Chaudoin & Milner, 2017), a large number of 
scholars both in the U.S. and especially elsewhere fail to be persuaded by it (for a collec-
tion of mostly critical assessments, see Phillips & Weaver, 2011). Some have developed 
alternatives, such as the new interdependence approach (Farrell and Newman, 2014; 
2016; 2019), which seeks to explain the consequences of economic openness and glo-
balization instead of focusing on their causes, while also enlarging the explanandum 
to cover, for example, global business regulation (in the broad sense of Braithwaite and 
Drahos, 2000). Another example is the political economy of complex interdependence 
approach (Oatley, 2019), which tries to take into account the openness and non-ergodici-
ty of all social systems in a manner that seems somewhat reminiscent of post-Keynesian 
approaches.2 While these openings take some steps toward the direction that we advo-
cate in this paper, our aspirations are broader in terms of the explananda3 as well as 
metatheoretically more systematic and explicit. 
OEP and related American approaches rely heavily on the conceptual arsenal and 
authority of mainstream economics (Wade, 2009) and, to reiterate, often draw directly 
on the standard neoclassical theory. These approaches provide a rather clear instance 
of economics imperialism (especially ‘imperialism of style’, as defined by Mäki, 2009).4 
2 Thomas Oatley (2019) mentions the concept of open systems on p. 960 in Table 1, but does not define 
or develop it or provide any sources, even though there has been a rich discussion about the concept in 
post-Keynesian economics and critical realism (and various other sites of discussions). The concept of 
non-ergodicity is taken to mean that the system of global political economy changes as it moves through 
time, i.e. time and history matters. While this is a step forward, Oatley defines non-ergodicity somewhat 
counterproductively via references to North (1999) and David (2001). Both are economists advocating a 
form of ‘historical economics’ that tends to take the categories of contemporary mainstream economics as 
given when interpreting history or dynamic systems regardless of the time period or context under study. 
For a criticism of ‘new economic history’ also known as ‘cliometrics’, see Boldizzoni (2011); and regarding 
the historicity of social beingness, Patomäki (2020a).
3 The new and complex interdependence approaches seek to explain regulatory changes also in view of 
whether they make, for instance, financial crises more likely. The latter expands the explanandum further 
by making a distinction between local and global financial crises and exploring their causes in terms of 
economic contagion and regulatory diffusion. Oatley maintains that in terms of contagion and diffusion 
the U.S. is in an exceptional position in the world economy. From this point of view it is possible to argue 
that the attempt of OEP scholars to narrow down the approach and explananda of IPE is implicitly based 
on their US-centrism (ultimately only the US and its domestic politics seems to matter; or at least the ap-
proach that seems, from a particular perspective, adequate in the U.S. context, is assumed to be applicable 
everywhere). At any rate, as will become obvious in the course of this paper, we see no reason to limit the 
explananda of Global Political Economy to regulatory changes and financial crises, even though both are 
important.
4 It is not surprising, of course, that American IPE has been conquered by the techniques and substantial 
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Instead of encouraging a balanced dialogue between politics and economics, in terms 
of its basic outlook and underlying worldview American IPE has largely become a sub-
branch of the mainstream version of the latter – a development that Susan Strange 
(1970) early on feared.5 
Examined from a Strangean perspective critical of economics imperialism, much of 
IPE appears to evade hard big-picture questions about the politics of the world economy 
as a whole. The main part of especially the US strand of IPE tries to identify empirical 
regularities between different sets of economic and political ‘variables’, often following 
the methodologically deductivist and nationalist OEP scheme: economic theory { do-
mestic interests { national negotiations { national policies (oriented toward closed 
or open economy) { international negotiations { international policies { possible 
feedback effects on sub-state and state interests (again interpreted in light of economic 
theory). What is noteworthy is that in these studies categories such as ‘interests’ and 
‘states’ are routinely reified.6  
The frustration with the OEP approach reflects an undergoing change in main-
stream economics whose substantive neoclassical tenets are under attack from several 
different directions, some of which are novel.7 Because a decreasing number of scholars 
find the standard Friedmanian ‘as if’ response to a theory’s major deviations from re-
alisticness convincing, economists now seem forced to downplay their commitment to 
the substance of neoclassicism at least rhetorically (Berg & Gigerenzer, 2010). Follow-
ing David Colander, Richard Holt, and Barkley Rosser (2004), they now often equate 
economics with its methodological practices of statistical analysis (econometrics) and 
mathematical modelling. In other words, while the familiar question settings, concep-
tual categories and ‘contrast spaces’ still inform its expert practices, mainstream eco-
nomics is being reframed as a mere methodological apparatus without much content or 
even domain [!] of its own. Something closely related has been going on in IPE: interna-
claims of mainstream economics. The former have been employed also outside social sciences, especially 
in biology (there is a long historical link between the two disciplines: a key source of Darwin’s theory of 
evolution and the idea of ‘survival of the fittest’ was Malthus’s hypothesis concerning population growth).
5 According to Strange (1970, p. 314), most economists ‘convey the impression that they regard consorting 
with other social scientists as a form of intellectual slumming’.
6 Here we refer to the sense of reification as specified by Anthony Giddens (1979, p. 195), highlighting how 
particular interests are objectivised and naturalised. According to Giddens, forms of signification which 
‘naturalise’ the existing social relations and circumstances inhibit recognition of the mutable, historical 
character of human society and thereby act to sustain prevailing interests (of groups, classes or sectors, 
or states).
7 For example, the core rational choice axioms of the theory are now contradicted by evidence mounting 
in the cognitive sciences (Berg & Gigerenzer, 2010), while the rapidly changing circumstances in the world 
economy in 2007–2020 have called into question the prevailing macroeconomic consensus and opened 
up space for arguments that for decades were marginalised (see e.g. The Economist 2020).
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tional political economy has become simply one more domain to the study of which the 
‘incredibly flexible’ methodology of economics is applied. As a result, there is little room 
for social or political theory left in it. Moreover, the idea of ‘micro-foundations’ imported 
from economics leads IPE toward reductionist atomism, where the component parts 
and elements such as sub-state interests are aggregated at state and inter-state levels 
and where the wider whole is, by and large, just the sum of its components.
When the new economics-as-a-methodology combines with the old methodological 
nationalism, we get mostly either country-based case studies or large-N statistical com-
parisons between allegedly self-contained individual economies and their (somewhat 
epiphenomenal) political systems. In other words, we tend to get more economics as 
currently practiced. Interestingly, then, both the ‘international’ or ‘global’ and ‘political’ 
aspects of conventional IPE seem to be gradually eroding, replaced by (broadly) positiv-
ist comparative PE.8
Fortunately, there is no lack of alternatives. We have already mentioned the new and 
complex interdependence approaches. In this paper, we will discuss various alternative 
and critical approaches —that in fact constitute the mainstream in many IPE units in 
Europe – more broadly. Since the heydays of the first full-bodied critical IPE approach, 
namely neo-Gramscianism in the 1990s, the diversity of critical perspectives has in-
creased.9 As a result, the current spectrum of approaches might be larger than ever. 
However, this development does not mean that the critical approaches would generally 
have become more popular. In fact, the most prominent American journals in the field 
have until recently largely failed to publish critical work (the situation has not much 
changed since Maliniak and Tierney, 2009, although there are exceptions). In addition 
to their varying popularity in different geo-economic regions, the critical schools tend 
to display divergences in style and, most importantly, are riddled with both apparent 
and genuine disagreements at the level of substance. Their challenge towards the main-
stream hence comes in a number of forms and is not easily summarized into a few key 
points of contestation. 
The lowest common denominator shared by more or less all of the critical approach-
es that we can spot is that they take the pluralist nature of social science seriously. Crit-
ical IPE, in all its manifestations, draws from the rich body of social research from so-
cial theory and anthropology to history and future studies (and occasionally also from 
8 On the disappearance of the ‘I’ in IPE, see also Keohane (2009), and on the disappearance of the ‘P’, see 
Kirshner (2011).
9 Despite its shortcomings, Coxian-Gillian neo-Gramscianism provided the critical scholarship with 
some coherence. While the neo-Gramscian perspective is by no means forgotten, it is no longer as cen-
tral to the contemporary British and Canadian IPE as it used to be. Critical IPE has clearly entered a 
post-neo-Gramscian age.
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bordering natural sciences, such as ecology, geography, and complex systems science). 
We fully embrace this feature of critical scholarship alongside its accompanying com-
mitment to methodological pluralism. Although simplicity, consistency and explanato-
ry unification are important scientific values, they should not be pursued at the cost of 
informativeness, realisticness and accuracy, all of which can benefit from pluralism. 10 
The shared pluralist commitments certainly provide a good starting point for mov-
ing towards a more relevant IPE. However, pluralism alone is hardly enough – even a 
deeply fragmented field can be ‘pluralist’ in one sense of term. At present, the critical 
approaches are lacking a framework for adequate causal (and normative) analysis that 
could foster benign, non-cacophonous forms of pluralism. There are useful frameworks 
such as neo-Gramscianism and the new and complex interdependence approaches, but 
they are too limited and specific in some important ways, including in terms of their 
explananda. A key reason for the evident absence of an effective and systematic alter-
native to the OEP and other positivist approaches is that critical IPE has thus far failed 
to address satisfactorily two key deficiencies from which it has arguably suffered from 
its very beginning, including the pioneering work of Strange and Robert Cox. These are: 
(1) Lack of philosophical depth and methodological rigour. Overwhelm-
ingly, the ‘method’ of critical IPE still consists of disorganized story-
telling without sufficient effort at the formulation of explicit hypothe-
ses – whether qualitative or quantitative, historical or future-oriented 
– amenable to empirical test and revision. Metatheoretically, the field 
at large remains in the grips of the unproductive positivism / postpos-
itivism schism (in the sense of Patomäki & Wight 2000), a split long 
ago discredited in the philosophy of science. Overwhelmingly, critical 
scholars continue to self-identify as postpositivists of some kind and 
hence waste energy and opportunity in avoiding terminology that 
‘sounds positivistic’ instead of engaging with the concepts and par-
ticipating in their reinterpretation and application for the purposes 
of social research. Evermore deeply entrenched epistemological and 
methodological disagreement, greatly exacerbated by lack of a shared 
lexicon, is arguably the single most important driver towards further 
fragmentation of the field. 
10 As Rescher (1993) pointed out, there is a trade-off between consistency and informativeness. Simply 
put, it is easy to be consistent if one says very little. In an analogous way, explanatory unification becomes 
easy if one throws away enough evidence. For a still powerful criticism of the myth of simplicity, see Bunge 
(1963).
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(2) Paucity of explicit and systematic economic theorisation. Critical IPE 
continues to be impaired by its lack of reflective attention to econom-
ic theory (although there are some very welcome recent contributions 
that seek to address this problem explicitly, a few of which are listed be-
low). Given that it has always aimed at bringing together insights from 
at least the political and economic sciences11, the relative ignorance of 
alternative economic theories has been somewhat surprising. There 
has certainly been no corresponding shortage of interest towards rad-
ical political and social theory – in fact, critical IPE is often little else. 
At first sight, these two types of shortcomings may appear unrelated. No improvement 
in its underlying philosophical foundation or methodological arsenal would neces-
sitate critical IPE to direct more attention to developments in economics. Nor would 
any amount of novel interest towards economic theory in itself lead to advances in the 
epistemic underpinnings or methodological quality of the research conducted. Even 
if these two deficiencies afflicting the field may thus be logically distinct, we can still 
observe many interesting (practical) connections between them. A serious attempt to 
rectify either one of the shortcomings could thus move us significantly closer to recti-
fying the other. On the one hand, productive mutual engagement between critical IPE 
and non-standard economics clearly requires a plausible metatheoretical framework to 
guide the cross-disciplinary effort (see also Lainà, 2018a). On the other hand, attention 
to economic theory would help critical IPE to address some of its epistemological and 
methodological shortcomings related to the lack of causal explanations. While by no 
means providing a methodologically uniform or otherwise unproblematic body of work, 
various post-Keynesian, institutional, feminist, Marxian and other strands of economic 
theory can provide a rich resource of tools and concepts and thereby inform explicit, 
but still context-sensitive and historically specific, research hypotheses that readily lend 
themselves to empirical scrutiny. On average, pluralist approaches to economic theory 
have arguably been better at formulating and appraising such hypotheses than scholars 
in critical IPE.
In light of our stress on economic theory and explicit hypotheses, one might suspect 
that we would ultimately favour a version of the American approach. However, this is 
not the case for two main reasons. First, in calling for reflective attention to economic 
theory we are not arguing that IPE should become a sub-branch of economics, whether 
11 In Strange’s (1970) more specific original vision, IPE was supposed to fuse insights of International 
Relations and International Economics. American scholars, such as Robert Gilpin (1981, 1987), tried to 
accomplish something similar (Gilpin, 1981, combined statism, non-standard economics and rational 
choice). The neo-Gramscians went still further in their cross-disciplinary ambitions.  
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orthodox or heterodox (we prefer the term ‘pluralist’12). On the contrary, it should grow 
into a truly cross-disciplinary area of research. Economic theory should play an impor-
tant role in IPE, but it is vital to (i) understand its internal diversity, and (ii) view it as 
epistemically on par with other forms of social theorizing. The relative weight we put on 
economic theory, and from which of its many traditions we at each time choose to draw 
on, should always depend on the research question at hand. Of course, as IPE studies 
the international political economy, all research that falls within its domain builds on 
some economic premises either wittingly or unwittingly. Our recipe is to build on them 
wittingly. Moreover, we argue for a reflexive attitude to economic theory: it is an impor-
tant source of societal power whose performative effects constitute a part of the subject 
matter of the social sciences, especially in IPE.13  
Second, when we argue for explicit hypotheses and their systematic appraisal, we are 
not arguing for more quantification, statistical analysis and formal modelling.14 These 
are appropriate ways to systematize and test some kinds of hypotheses, but they provide 
meagre resources for studying the social realm (on overcoming dichotomies between 
quantitative and qualitative methods, see e.g. Arestis, Brown & Sawyer, 2002; Brannen, 
2005; Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2005; Pratschke, 2003). In this respect, our criticism of 
the OEP and other positivist IPE approaches (and mainstream economics) is that it is 
based on a hopelessly narrow and outdated view on what ‘respectable science’ amounts 
to. In other words, while both economic theory and a scientific orientation are crucially 
important for IPE, both of them should be reconceived in broad, pluralist, and realist 
terms. Moreover, as we will discuss below in greater detail, the OEP approach tends to 
slide back toward methodological nationalism, further limiting its explanatory scope 
12 The terminology of ‘heterodoxy’ vs. ‘pluralism’ has been a topic of intensive discussions during the past 
couple of decades. There is a journal called International Journal of Pluralism and Economics Education, 
various special issues (see e.g. The Journal of Philosophical Economics, I:2, 2008), and numerous calls for 
pluralism (for a discussion on Geoffrey Hodgson’s prominent appeal, see Dow, 2019). The problem with 
the term ‘heterodox’ is that it is defined in oppositional terms. If a particular strand of what is currently 
‘heterodox’ becomes orthodox in a new context, the meaning of ‘heterodox’ becomes indeterminate. More 
importantly, as we will argue in this paper, controversies and pluralism are critically important for scien-
tific progress. What is also noteworthy is that the idea of pluralism resonates with the epistemic justifica-
tion of democracy (in addition, democracy can be justified also normatively).
13 On performativity, see e.g. MacKenzie, Muniesa, & Siu (2007). The performative effects of any theory 
form part of the subject matter of reflexive social science. However, our hunch is that mainstream eco-
nomics has currently a wider performative impact on general thought and public policy than perhaps any 
other form of inquiry.  
14 As an example of how indeterminate statistical studies tend to be, Ranjit Lall (2016) shows how the 
results of statistical country comparisons published in International Organization and World Politics dur-
ing 2007–2012 change dramatically if the missing information in the raw data of the studies is deleted us-
ing a more accurate method (multiple imputation) than the one typically employed (listwise deletion). In 
roughly half of the cases, apparently statistically significant results become insignificant (and the results 
change also in most other cases considered). 
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and power. The sort of pluralist realism we advocate in this paper can combat this kind 
of narrowness of view.  
In this paper, we make four claims: (1) there is a limit to how far IPE can go without 
addressing economic theory explicitly and reflectively; (2) economics has unhelpfully 
insulated itself from the concerns of political economy; (3) cross-disciplinary engage-
ment capable of overcoming both the philosophical and economic deficiencies identified 
above has to build on some version of critical social scientific realism or something suf-
ficiently similar such as realist pragmatism; and (4) IPE should illuminate structures, 
mechanisms and processes that are not confined by state borders (suggesting the name 
Global Political Economy, GPE). 
THE LIMITS OF IPE WITHOUT ECONOMIC THEORY
The absence of explicit economic theory is relatively clear in the case of the neo-Gram-
scian approach – arguably the first critical approach to contemporary IPE. In his mag-
num opus, Cox (1987) described painstakingly the formation of different relations of 
production, social forces and forms of state throughout world history, and how they, in 
turn, have played a role in the making of the post-World War II era, particularly within 
the OECD region. While Cox provided a novel account of the rise and the subsequent 
crisis and demise of the Bretton Woods system, relying on systematic historicism, there 
is a distant parallel to the OEP logic of explanation in the sense that in Cox’s explanato-
ry scheme production is the origin and foundation of both domestic politics and world 
order. Production generates resources that can be transformed to other forms of power. 
The main explanandum is changes of world order, in turn shaping developments in 
various local and national contexts. In a similar manner, the followers of Cox have tried 
to describe and explain changes in the forms of state and governance of the capitalist 
world economy. Stephen Gill (e.g. 1993, 2008) together with others (e.g. Gill & Cutler, 
2015) have used concepts introduced by Cox to criticise conventional approaches in IR 
and IPE (suggesting that the latter ought to be renamed as Global Political Economy, 
GPE). Initially, the most common theme they addressed was the neoliberal transition 
that swept the world with dramatic consequences in the 1980s and 1990s. In the 1990s, 
the main focus of analysis shifted to the establishment and locking-in of this worldwide 
transition. Characteristically, the neo-Gramscian stories about these developments re-
fer to relations of production, historic blocs of social forces, organic intellectuals, class 
power, and cultural hegemony. The methodological idea was to take distance from the 
existing order and power-relations and open up a space for discussions on alternative 
possibilities (policies, institutions, social relations).
The neo-Gramscian project seems usually to be only indirectly concerned with un-
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derstanding and explaining economic growth, efficiency, (un)employment, business 
cycles, financial crises, distribution of income, or any of the other core topics of eco-
nomics (although Cox did try to provide a generic explanation of distribution in terms of 
changing power-relations; it must also be mentioned that Gill & Law, 1988, remains an 
early and still useful exception). These themes typically form the background for inter-
pretations of history rather than the explanandum of studies (perhaps most explicitly 
in Cox, 1987, Chapter 8; see also Cox, 1983). This seems to indicate that neo-Gramscian 
political economy is, at best, complementary to economic theory. Of course, to the ex-
tent that it can help to explain forms of states and regimes of regulation, both crucial 
to determining economic outcomes, it could also improve economic analysis. However, 
such a welcome prospect would presuppose at least some significant reunification with 
economics.
Because of its shortage of economic analysis, the neo-Gramscian framework failed 
to offer resources to anticipate or explain the financial meltdown of 2008–2009 or the 
subsequent Eurozone crisis (the new and complex interdependence approaches may be 
seen as complementary in this regard, even if also these approaches lack an explicit eco-
nomic theory). Neither has it offered much novel insight in the aftermath of the calamity 
nor during the Covid-19 pandemic. As a result of this and IPE’s more general inability to 
account for the financial crisis (Cohen, 2009b; but see note 3), there has been a marked 
shift of interest towards post-Keynesian and, to a degree, Marxian economics among 
the critically minded.15 In our judgment, this development was one of the few positive 
outcomes of the financial crisis. Indeed, it is a development to which IPE must respond 
if it wants to gain wider relevance and improve its explanatory power.
A survey of recent IPE research supports our observation about the relative decline 
of the neo-Gramscian approach, and perhaps indicates some gradual increase in reflec-
tive and critical interest towards economic theory. A Handbook of IPE edited by Mark 
Blyth (2009) does not include a chapter dedicated to the neo-Gramscian approach, and 
Cohen (2017) does not even mention neo-Gramscianism in listing approaches to the 
IPE of money. A small, but possibly increasing, number of current studies addresses 
economics in depth or even draws explicitly on pluralist economic theorising.
 Blyth and Matthias Matthijs’s (2017) ‘endogenous’ explanation of capitalist regime 
change relies largely on Keynes, Kalecki and Goodhart. Ben Selwyn (2017) employs 
Marxian ideas to criticise accounts of ‘anti-poverty consensus’ and ‘anti-poverty coun-
15 Given that the crisis took by surprise both mainstream economics (which has also seemed unable to 
learn from it; see Bigo & Negru, 2014; Mirowski, 2014; Morgan, 2015) and, to only a slightly lesser extent, 
virtually all of IPE (for but a partial exception, see Patomäki, 2005), the conditions for the renaissance 
of pluralist economic theorising in at least some academic circles (and in the blogosphere) were rather 
favourable.
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ter-consensus’ in development economics. Anastasia Nesvetailova (2015) and Herman 
Schwartz (2018) ask theoretical questions about the nature of money, banking16 and 
finance in explaining the global financial crisis of 2008–9 and the role of US dollar as an 
international reserve currency, respectively. Inspired by the recent work on the financial 
calamity by the economic historian Adam Tooze (2018) and Perry Mehrling’s (2010) ear-
lier stress on the ‘money view’, there is now a novel literature on (critical) macro-finance 
(for an introduction, see e.g. Dutta et al, 2020). This literature makes regular, although 
somewhat disjointed, references to the post-Keynesian work of Hyman Minsky (Bonizzi 
& Kaltenbrunner 2020). In their book on the EU and global capitalism, Magnus Ryner 
and Alan Cafruny (2017) employ a mixture of Marxian and post-Keynesian economic 
theories (see also Ryner, 2012). Patomäki (2013; 2018) synthesises a range of unortho-
dox economic theories in explaining the Eurozone crisis and present-day disintegrative 
tendencies in global political economy (see also Khan and Patomäki 2013). The role of 
reflexivity and performativity of economic theory in explaining economic outcomes is 
explored by Heimberger and Kapeller (2017) and Patomäki (2019a). Despite such wel-
come signs of heterodox economics slowly entering IPE, much work remains to be done 
– both in theoretical and metatheoretical terms.
When we seek to explain key historical developments or criticise prevailing policies 
and practices of governance, the concerns of economic theory clearly cannot be ignored. 
What determines economic efficiency and growth? What causes (asset price) inflation, 
solvency issues, and financial meltdowns? What about deflation, unemployment or 
underemployment? What explains business cycles or changes in income distribution? 
Under what conditions do fundamental economic crises occur? What are the socio-eco-
nomic consequences of such events? And perhaps most acutely, what kind of economic 
activities would be ecologically sustainable?  
Critical IPE unwilling or unable to provide answers to these kinds of questions is 
likely to remain a marginal phenomenon – a specific set of approaches within a particu-
lar strand of the discipline of International Relations. Consider, for example, the case 
of explaining the process of neoliberalisation (which refers roughly to the same phe-
nomenon as ‘open or liberal economic policy’ and ‘globalisation’ in OEP, although from 
a very different perspective). According to the neo-Gramscian explanatory stories (see 
Cox, 1987, 1996; Gill, 1990, 1991, 1995; see also Rupert, 1990, 1995), policymakers of the 
OECD countries have since the 1970s embraced monetarist and other ‘market-friendly’ 
policies as a particular, biased response to the perceived problems that emerged in the 
late 1960s. This response is then explained in terms of a change in power relations in 
favour of transnational capital. A further claim could be that there are also ‘objective’ 
16 With an explicit focus on banking, Lainà (2018b) combines post-Keynesian economics and critical IPE 
to study theoretical underpinnings and political potentials of full-reserve banking.
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reasons for this shift, for it largely originated in changes in the relations of production, 
which reflected a transition from the Fordist towards a post-Fordist regime of accumu-
lation. 
Leaving OEP aside (it evolved only after Cox’s major works), explanations along 
these lines fail to engage the standard view among mainstream economists, according 
to which the turn to monetarism and new classical macroeconomics (instead of, say, 
post-Keynesianism that had anticipated rising levels of inflation)17 was the epistemically 
most rational response available in face of the genuine problems of the post-war neo-
classical synthesis, such as the ‘instability’ of the Phillips curve. There are thus many 
possible hypothetical explanations of the same change. A fully adequate critical account 
of what the neo-Gramscians call neoliberal transition would (a) need to explain why 
mainstream economists believe that the transition rested on a solid intellectual basis 
and (b) call that belief into question directly in argumentative terms. For instance, it 
could be pointed out that orthodox macroeconomic premises push towards the view 
that Keynesian policies are intrinsically inflation prone and that this concern is then 
then developed into theories about political business cycles and non-governability of ex-
cessive democracies (e.g. Crozier, Huntington, & Watanuki, 1975). In order to tackle this 
problematic, examine the premises, and to assess different hypotheses systematically, 
we clearly need to adopt or develop plausible accounts of inflation, (un)employment, 
business cycles, international trade18, and state finance. A truly relevant, economically 
literate IPE would address these topics with a depth that current mainstream econom-
ics can never hope to reach.  
In addition to neglecting pertinent research themes, without explicit and reflective 
attitude towards economic theorizing, critical IPE may inadvertently commit itself to 
questionable assumptions about economic mechanisms and processes. For instance, 
numerous Marxian-oriented and other ostensibly critical political economists have long 
assumed that government bond markets discipline all states regardless of their level of 
employment or the nature of their financial institutions and laws (see e.g. Strange, 1997, 
pp. 190–191; Streeck, 2014; Tabb, 2004, p. 120). This assumption is what Lauri Holappa 
(2020) calls the bond-market-power narrative. Holappa demonstrates the popularity of 
17 Decades before stagflation, Joan Robinson (e.g. 1980, pp. 38–39), a major post-Keynesian, had antic-
ipated that ‘rising prices would prove to be the great unresolved problem of the full-employment policy’. 
By referring to Kalecki, however, she added that this problem remains unresolved only under the cur-
rent institutional arrangements. The political options are thus either a return to orthodoxy (class conflict 
resolved in favour of concentrations of capital) or development of new social and political institutions 
(democratising the ‘economic’ to reflect the increased power of the employees; see also Patomäki, 2019, 
for the reflexivity of expectations about inflation).
18 For instance, Ylönen and Teivainen (2017) argue that crucial assumptions of standard free-market 
trade theory fail to hold in practice and world trade thus needs to be studied from a more realistic political 
economy perspective (embracing also normative political theory).
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the narrative in both strands of modern Political Economy, namely International and 
Comparative Political Economy (on related problematic economic premises in IPE, see 
also Kotilainen 2016). Such an assumption is also made by Gill and David Law (1989, p. 
481) in a problematic passage that suggests that governments cannot bypass bond mar-
kets unless they are willing to resort to ‘monetary inflation’.19 This concept originates 
in the orthodox quantity theory of money that posits a straightforward causal relation 
between the quantity of money in circulation and the general price level. (Roughly: MV 
= pq, where M = total amount of money in circulation, V = velocity of money, p = general 
price level, and q = real output of goods and services. In the quantity theory of money, 
V and q are usually assumed to remain constant, and causation is always expected to 
run from M to p.) 
Both the quantity theory of money and the bond-market-power narrative are ques-
tionable. John Maynard Keynes (1936/1961) argued against the quantity theory of 
money by reasoning that changes in the circulation of money can affect interest rates, 
investments and output (thereby affecting q in addition to p). In Abba Lerner’s (1951) 
hypothesis, the inflationary effect becomes dominant only when an economy approach-
es full employment, although prices tend upwards already before it is reached because 
of cost pressures – unless countered by appropriate incomes policies.20 A standard 
post-Keynesian view is that genuine full employment is rare and capitalist monetary 
economies are normally characterised by considerable excess capacity and involuntary 
unemployment (see e.g. Lavoie, 2014).21 Moreover, neochartalists have argued that the 
extent of market discipline a state faces depends partially on whether the state can issue 
debt in its own (floating) currency and whether most of its debt is in fact denominated 
in this currency. How big a proportion of its debt the state can reasonably hope to issue 
19 Overall, the argument of Gill and Law (1989, p. 481) is somewhat ambiguous. It is not clear to what 
extent the authors think that the ‘structural power of capital’ is based on non-ideational mechanisms of 
capitalist market economy; and to what extent they explain it rather in terms of hegemonic economic ide-
as. Sometimes Gill and Law talk about believes held by actors (for instance, ‘an assumption behind these 
arguments is that there is a market for capital, enterprise, and inventiveness, and the supply of these will 
be reduced by higher taxation’); at other points they refer to mechanisms that seem independent of actors’ 
beliefs. See Bell (2012), for an attempt to clarify the role of ideas in the ‘structural power of business’.
20 A number of competing explanations about inflation exist. For example, many post-Keynesians regard 
inflation as being an outcome of an unresolved distributional conflict; and these socio-economic conflicts 
are usually seen as conditioned by the institutional context (e.g. Burdekin & Burkett, 1996). In an open 
social system, any concrete inflationary process is path-dependent and evolves through the interdepend-
ence of different sectors, actors and policies.
21 Orthodox economic theory assumes that in the ‘long run’ the economy is characterised by ‘full’ em-
ployment (compatible with the so-called NAIRU level of unemployment) and ‘full’ capacity utilisation 
(compatible with the so-called NAIRCU). These assumptions make the monetary inflation story appear 
superficially credible. Several Marxian and other critical political economists are unwittingly committed 
to versions of this view. See Holappa (2020, pp. 35-52, and later chps).
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in its currency in turn depends for instance on the currency’s global demand (and thus, 
we would like to stress, on the state’s positioning in the division of labour and power 
in the world economy – factors often downplayed by the neochartalists). If states bor-
row in their own currency and their central banks control interest rates on government 
debt, governments can often bypass international bond markets even when they run 
budget deficits and conduct expansionary policies. In such benign circumstances, states 
have the capacity to finance their spending also through their central banks. (See e.g. 
Fullwiler, 2007; Kelton 2011; Tymoigne, 2014; Wray 2015) The bond markets tend to 
exert most pressure on states that borrow in foreign currencies (the euro is equivalent to 
foreign currency for all EU member states), even if also this generalization is subject to 
a number of institutional and other contingencies.22 An economically fully literate IPE 
would take these and other non-standard insights into account when reflecting on its 
theoretical commitments. Many pitfalls could be so avoided. 
THE SELF-INSULATION OF ECONOMICS  
FROM OTHER SOCIAL SCIENCES
A key challenge for a more adequate IPE approach is the self-insulation of economics 
from other social sciences. This self-insulation was both a cause and an effect of the 
process of increasing separation of the sphere of ‘economy’ from the rest of society in 
the 19th century (Morgan & Patomäki, forthcoming). The success of what has later been 
named as the neoclassical revolution stemmed from the fact that it simultaneously 
safeguarded the kernel of the classical laissez-faire orthodoxy – the social-reformist 
intentions and ideas of Marshall, Walras and others notwithstanding – and made it 
accord with the 19th century idea of the Scientific Method. Physics provided the model 
to emulate and served as a crucial source of both metaphors and techniques. The early 
neoclassicists strove for mathematical description, mechanical explanation, and repro-
ducibility of tests (see Mirowski, 1992, for details), although some of them developed 
also evolutionary and historicist ideas (for an analysis of these antinomies, see Hart, 
2012; Morgan & Patomäki, forthcoming). The key to scientific economics, they often 
presumed, would lie in understanding the way the ‘price mechanism’ functions in an 
economy with many consumers, producers and commodities. The neoclassicists went 
on to argue that this price mechanism could be studied in terms of budget-constrained 
22 A key current debate within pluralist economics concerns the nature of budget constraints in different 
contexts. Whereas the neochartalists argue that budget constraints do not apply to ‘monetarily sovereign’ 
states, other theorists such as Anwar Shaikh (2016, p. 690) maintain that ‘central bankers must always 
have Argentinas on their minds; once this is recognized, then it is clear that in practice Treasuries are also 
budget-constrained’. Despite his criticisms of neochartalism, also Shaikh rejects both the quantity theory 
of money and the idea that state finances are necessarily dependent on bond markets.
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optimization, marginal changes of quantities, and equilibrium dynamics. The mathe-
matical tools of calculus, sharpened by followers of Newton and Leibniz for two centu-
ries, made the project technically feasible. 
Once the conceptual basis was established, neoclassical economists could focus on 
studying mathematical properties of abstract formal systems by employing ever more 
sophisticated mathematical and statistical tools. This emphasis, which was also influ-
enced by many contingent and extrinsic factors (see Amadae, 2003; Lawson, 2003, 
Chapter 10) has had three far-reaching effects. First, in contrast to the classical political 
economy of Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, John Stuart Mill and others, the ‘economy’ 
was analytically separated from the rest of society (and implicitly or explicitly assumed 
to be concomitant with the territory of a nation-state, hence the term ‘national econ-
omy’). Second, the practice-driven real-world problems of classical economists faded 
into the background and large strands of economics started to resemble a branch of 
mathematics, rather than social science. Third, the more the economists began to focus 
on the formal properties of abstract systems, the more self-evident and indisputable the 
conceptual foundations of their narrow approach started to appear to them. Gradually, 
economists lost sensitivity to alternative conceptualizations. For instance, Keynes’s gen-
eral theory (1936/1961) was quickly transformed into a formal IS-LM apparatus (Hicks, 
1937), which conveniently contracted the potentially revolutionary opening into a mere 
special case of the largely orthodox neoclassical synthesis (instead of the other way 
around, as Keynes himself intended). 
Over time, each of these three developments has sparked controversy and, in turn, a 
variety of responses from the economics profession. The strict separation of the ‘econ-
omy’ from other spheres of society was followed by economics imperialism that saw an 
economic logic of optimisation under constraints operative virtually everywhere. The 
most abstract of the mathematical models have slowly given way to more empirical, 
‘problem-oriented’ micro-research and behavioural approaches; and even the main-
stream macroeconomic consensus has absorbed some ‘foreign’ concepts and concerns, 
although ‘Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium’ (DSGE) models remain popular, 
and the ‘Aggregate Demand-Aggregate Supply’ (AD-AS) model (a modification of the 
IS-LM apparatus) still informs standard macroeconomics teaching.
Contemporary mainstream economics is characterised by some and apparently rap-
idly increasing diversity of approaches and topics. The global financial crisis of 2008-9 
and circumstances created by the Covid-19 crisis have led to further questioning of the 
standard approaches especially to macroeconomics. Meanwhile, over several decades, 
large parts of mainstream economics have become ever more method-driven. Both the 
advocates of economics imperialism and its critics have repeatedly claimed that the 
only thing that unites different strands of economics is a shared methodological basis. 
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Moreover, even this basis seems now to be shifting, as the rise of behavioural economics 
testifies (for a popular overview, Thaler, 2015). However, one can nonetheless point to a 
broad combination of methodological and also substantive commitments that contin-
ues to constitute a dominant way of conducting economics. 
Following Lionel Robbins (1932, p. 15), economics has for almost a century been un-
derstood as a science that studies the efficient allocation of scarce means to satisfy com-
peting ends (see e.g. Becker, 1978, pp. 3–4). Economists standardly assume stable and 
non-socially formed preferences (although usually only at a high level of abstraction and 
with some caveats), optimising behaviour, and the applicability of equilibrium analysis. 
Everything can be ascribed a price, if not a market price, then at least a ‘shadow price’ 
(opportunity cost). Any relevant behaviour can be described and explained in these 
terms, independently of whether the actors themselves think they are optimising and 
imputing prices. Game theory is based on the same elements, but adds interdepend-
ence of rational choices and some level of reflexivity. There have been some genuinely 
positive developments in this area of research, such as evolutionary game theory, which 
allows for certain type of modifications in actor preferences (for an enlightening discus-
sion on James Buchanan’s idea that genuine human choice encompasses the possibility 
that people may choose the kind of person they wish to become, in particular by select-
ing the kind of preferences they wish to have, see Lewis & Dold, 2019). However, it is 
revealing that game theory is supposed to require mathematical training but hardly any 
background in the social sciences, not necessarily even in economics (for an early ex-
ample, see Copeland, 1945). The combination of social scientific illiteracy and epistemic 
hubris, boosted by the heavy use of formal methods, resulted in the much-debated phe-
nomenon of economics imperialism, explicated and defended by Gary Becker (1978) 
and others (e.g. Lazear, 2000). In addition, economics imperialism is driven by a set of 
understandable, but ultimately misplaced, hopes that originate from some readings of 
realist and naturalist philosophy of social science (for a discussion, Mäki, 2009). 
Also Tony Lawson (1997, 2003, 2012, 2013), a well-known critic of mainstream eco-
nomics, maintains that the only thing its numerous strands share is a methodological 
commitment: the insistence that certain methods of mathematical modelling (or related 
statistical techniques)23 must always be employed, irrespective of the research question 
23 Here we must leave aside problems related to the typical use of statistical techniques. Suffice is to men-
tion that there are significant limits on the possibility of meaningful measurement in the social sciences. 
The irreversibility of (often unique) processes demands concepts of qualitative rather than merely quan-
titative change. Moreover, meanings cannot be measured, only understood. Nevertheless, for instance re-
gression analysis can sometimes provide partial or tentative insights as a part of a wider research setting 
(Arestis, Brown, & Sawyer, 2002; Næss, 2004). Pratschke (2003) claims further that critical realism can 
help to resolve philosophical problems associated with the specification, assessment and interpretation 
of statistical models. Partial convergence of approaches may be possible and in some ways illuminating.
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at hand. Lawson might downplay the mainstream’s substantive commitments a bit too 
swiftly, but he is right to point out that these routinely used methods and techniques 
seem to presuppose event regularities that usually occur only in highly closed systems, 
whereas socio-economic systems are always more or less open.24 
From this methodological perspective, parts of non-standard economics are in fact 
surprisingly close to the mainstream. For instance, some post-Keynesians and analyti-
cal Marxists standardly employ the same kinds of mathematical methods as neoclassi-
cal economists, although they rarely take an equally dogmatic stance on their superiori-
ty. The overreliance on largely inappropriate tools leads to economic analyses that seem 
arbitrary for a political economist searching for illumination of concrete real-world 
developments. Despite the diversity of available (and conceivable) mathematical mod-
els, this arbitrariness is not a coincidence. The closed systems assumption inherent in 
much of formal modelling is closely related to atomism – implying ontological or at least 
methodological individualism –, which favours explanations framed in terms of differ-
ences between individuals; treats collective entities such as firms and states as individu-
als; and dismisses structural and systemic explanations (Garfinkel, 1981, Chapter 5). As 
Lawson (2012) stresses, the ontological implications of methodological choices matter. 
Relatedly, and in terms of overt substance, standardised neoclassical economics ed-
ucation teaches ‘perfect competition’ as a prototype of capitalist market economy, even if 
technically speaking only as one alternative along a two- or three-dimensional ‘contrast 
space’. All explanation (and normative judgement) involve some contrasts: why x rather 
than y? These contrasts, in turn, are shaped by theories, practical interests and values 
(on the significance of contrasts for scientific explanations, see Garfinkel, 1981; Lawson, 
1997, pp. 199–226; Morgan & Patomäki, 2017; van Fraassen, 1980). The neoclassical 
theory of competition provides an example of a two-dimensional contrast space that 
organizes the spectrum of relevant options around two apparently opposite poles: (1) 
from perfect competition to imperfect competition and monopoly; and (2) from fully 
competitive free markets to varying degrees of state intervention and, as a negative 
limit case, exclusively state-led centrally planned economy. These two dimensions form 
the basis of microeconomic theory. Because according to a common interpretation of 
methodological individualism, macroeconomics must have rigid ‘microfoundations’, 
24 Bhaskar (1975/2008, pp. 59–69) has explicated the ‘limit conditions’ for a closure. In what he calls 
the epistemically dominant case, a closed system must be strictly isolated from its environment, its con-
stitutive individuals atomistic, and the principle of organisation additive. In the epistemically recessive 
case, a system’s extrinsic and intrinsic conditions must merely remain constant. That is, although external 
influences are possible, they remain stable; and although the constitutive units are not strictly speaking 
atomistic, their structure can be taken as given, constant or always isomorphic. In both cases, the satisfac-
tion of a rather strict ceteris paribus clause must be required from all epistemically justified claims about 
event regularities, which renders them highly hypothetical, if not outright speculative. In society, there 
are no stable event regularities.
HELSINKI GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY WORKING PAPERS 1/2020
22
these dimensions are reproduced in macroeconomics, too. Since most economists rely 
routinely on the concept of Pareto efficiency, the third possible contrast dimension is 
the continuum of equilibrium outcomes in terms of welfare from those satisfying pure 
Pareto efficiency to ones in line with specific social welfare functions (that typically seek 
to balance efficiency and equity concerns) to ones plagued by Pareto inefficiency.  
Even when it is accepted that competition is in fact, or even necessarily, ‘imperfect’, 
the notion of perfect competition remains the main contrast and thereby, in effect, the 
guiding ideal. However unrealistic, it continues to inform both explanatory and norma-
tive purposes. Also some post-Keynesians and other critical economists may (perhaps 
unconsciously) hold on to the neoclassical contrast space, for example, when examining 
the macroeconomics of imperfect competition (Guerrian, 2016, p. 166; Shaikh, 2016, pp. 
327–379). Numerous theoretical, practical, and even emancipatory efforts presuppose 
that political economic processes somehow reflect the ‘basic’ model of perfect compe-
tition. Within this contrast space, it appears that many market ‘imperfections’ such as 
externalities can be remedied by defining property rights carefully enough and setting 
up ‘truly’ competitive markets (from emissions trading to ‘flexible’ wage setting). In the 
standard macro models, the apparently competitive price mechanism determines the 
‘normal’ functioning of most markets and hence the economy as a whole (this applies 
equally to neoclassical synthesis and the more recent RBC-, NMC- and DSGE-models). 
The problem is that the contrast space of neoclassical theory is generally both too 
abstract and too narrow for real world explanatory purposes. A related problem is the 
untestable and sometimes tautological nature of many of its fundamental assumptions, 
such as (1) those carried to their logical extreme by Becker and other champions of eco-
nomics imperialism (instrumental rationality, optimisation under constraints etc.); (2) 
those related to the ontologically spurious distinction between the ‘short run’ and the 
‘long run’ (see Morgan & Patomäki, forthcoming, chp 4); and (3) highly idealized and ar-
bitrary auxiliary assumptions such as perfect information, permanent income, Ricard-
ian equivalence and so on. As the neoclassical categories are very pervasive, also many 
strands of non-standard economics suffer from these or closely linked problems (such 
as occasional overreliance on mere mathematical or accounting identities in place of 
causal analysis). We argue that social sciences should be epistemologically open-mind-
ed and double-hermeneutical in their methodology. Contrasts should be specified close 
to concrete open-systemic historical realities. Equally importantly, all research requires 
careful conceptual work. For a theory to possess explanatory power and guide norma-
tive assessment, its contrast spaces and conceptual categories must be anchored in real 
geo-historical contexts.
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Table 1: Pluralist and heterodox approaches
TOWARDS PRODUCTIVE MUTUAL ENGAGEMENT
As a result of its insistence on the use of particular formal methods, and because of 
its problematic substantive assumptions and underlying philosophical commitments, 
mainstream economics has insulated itself from other traditions of social research. The 
almost only way this kind of economics has subsequently been able to relate to other 
social sciences has been by imposing its standards on others, behavioural economics 
being but a partial exception. The current state of IPE largely reflects these two de-
velopments in the relationship of economics with other social sciences. After econom-
ics broke with classical political economy and moral philosophy, most social scientists 
have generally not been keen to address economic issues. As we have argued, even IPE 
has thus far largely shied away from tackling the core questions of economics directly. 
Worse still, those working within OEP and related approaches have subsequently sur-
rendered to economics imperialism and taken the neoclassical doctrines as an unprob-
lematic starting point for their own explanatory pursuits. These strands of IPE import 
from mainstream economics heavily and explicitly and are in the process of turning 
IPE into a mere sub-branch of the latter discipline. Critical IPE, condemning economics 
imperialism in principle, has at times tacitly relied on neoclassical doctrines, even if 
only in an unacknowledged way. 
These mirror developments in economics and IPE pose difficulties for political econ-
omists like us who believe that IPE needs to develop a more reflective approach to eco-
nomic theory. A key question is whether there are realist and pluralist research in eco-
nomics and IPE that could allow bridging gaps between the disciplines. We believe that 
such approaches do exist in both fields, but in addition to substantial disagreements, 
there are also ontological and epistemological differences between them. Above we cit-
ed several IPE publications that already draw on economic theory reflectively. With-
in mainstream economics, there are some scholars (such as Joseph Stiglitz) and some 
approaches (such as behavioural economics) that aim at realisticness and explore the 
borderline areas of optimising behaviour. Table 1 summarises seven non-standard or 
pluralist approaches to economics, all of which provide at least some possible elements 
for new syntheses.
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The multifaceted differences between approaches in IPE and economics challenge us to 
think carefully about the philosophical preconditions of novel syntheses, let alone a pos-
sible reunification of the disciplines. Because scientific theories are complicated entities 
full of all sorts of tightly interlinked assumptions and propositions, one cannot simply 
take two promising theories and force them into one. Social sciences are double herme-
neutical and involve negotiations of meaning at different levels (meta–meta, metathe-
ory–theory, theory–theory, theory–lay understandings). Although competing theories 
and approaches can all provide useful concepts, ideas, hypotheses or narratives, when 
they presuppose untenable ontologies, they must be reinterpreted. For this purpose, 
we need a well-structured metatheoretical framework that enables a cogent transla-
tion of diverse claims in terms of a plausible social ontology, making them amenable to 
systematic assessment, falsification and revision. Such a framework should provide a 
set of tools, principles and other intellectual resources to guide cross-disciplinary work 
but still be sufficiently open to facilitate mutual learning. We believe that critical social 
scientific realism, enriched with insights from related philosophies of science, meets 
these requirements particularly well, and provides a structure within which economics 
and IPE could eventually reunite on non-imperialist terms. By encouraging explanatory 
unification driven by genuine dialogue it can serve as an effective alternative for recip-
rocal ignorance and arrogance. 
An attempt to develop a realist framework appropriate for such purposes can now 
draw on several sources, including (1) critical realism (e.g. Bhaskar, 1975/2008, 1986,; 
Harré, 1970, 1986; Lawson, 1997, 2003; in IR and IPE, Patomäki 2002); (2) realist prag-
matism (see e.g. Rescher, 1987, 1993, 1998, 2007, 2009; in IR, see Hamati-Ataya, 2012); 
(3) recent realist and naturalist approaches in the philosophy of social sciences (Kaides-
oja, 2013; Kuorikoski & Ylikoski, 2012; Little 2016; Mäki, 2011; Wimsatt, 2007); (4) 
works by other prominent realist analytic philosophers who have paid explicit attention 
to various questions in the foundations of the social sciences (Putnam, 2002; Searle, 
1995); (5) ongoing realist turn in continental philosophy (Harman, 2018; Meillassoux, 
2008). A considerable realist literature with high relevance for the social sciences now 
exists. While it is clear that not all (apparent or genuine) disagreements between these 
realist approaches have been settled, this should not discourage us from drawing on 
their immense shared basis and developing a particular synthesis of them. 
Critical realism is often associated with the works of Roy Bhaskar (1975/2008, 1986), 
although he relied heavily on Rom Harré (1970, 1986) and other earlier philosophers, 
and although CR has been a collective endeavour involving several prime movers such 
as Margaret Archer, Bob Jessop, Tony Lawson and Andrew Sayer (for an overview and 
analysis of the development of CR, Patomäki, 2019b). These scholars have developed 
the central positions of what has become an influential philosophy of social science. 
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Their variant of scientific realism placed heavy emphasis on a transcendental realist 
account of ontology, a central element of which is the idea that the mind-independent 
world must be structured, differentiated, changing, open-systemic and causal for our 
(scientific) practices to make sense. Because processes involve emergence, there are 
multiple layers of reality intertwined with each other. Mind and society are emergent. 
Reality is irreducible to (actual) events; it has depth, involves changeable structures and 
contains real possibilities, only some of which are ever actualised. As each emergent 
layer exhibits specific forms of complexity, there is room and need for certain division 
of scientific labour. The sciences are in the business of explaining the precise ways in 
which the world is layered, structured and organized (instead of aiming at empirical 
generalizations or ‘laws’ at the surface level of events). 
The goal of explaining how the (possibly unobservable) structures generate the di-
rectly observable entities and events requires a realist account of causality. In a stand-
ard CR conception, appropriately structured concrete entities will in suitable conditions 
exert certain kind of causal power on other concrete entities (Hárre, 1970; see also 
Kaidesoja, 2007). These real causal powers produce effects in open systems. From this 
perspective, it is wrong to assume that causation can be analysed in terms of simply 
necessary or sufficient conditions; yet this is presupposed if one talks about empirical 
invariances. The modified definition of cause as a so-called INUS-condition resolves 
this aporia, even if only partially. Cause is an Insufficient but Non-redundant element 
of a complex which is itself Unnecessary but Sufficient for the production of a result. 
One implication of the INUS-account is that a causal outcome depends on how different 
elements are organised and how they intra- and interact.25 Moreover, there are always 
many possible complexes capable of (co-)producing the same (or same kind of) outcome. 
In this conception, causation should be understood not only in terms of complexes as 
such, but also in terms of the subject matter in question. Complexes at different layers of 
reality are different in many ways. For this reason, the subject matter of social sciences 
is different from those of physics, chemistry, biology, although there are also similarities 
(cf. Bhaskar, 1979/1998).
Social worlds are open: (1) the relationship between the causal complexes and those 
of their outside (however defined) is typically not constant; and (2) change and qualita-
tive variation in the objects possessing causal powers – including social actors and in-
25 See Bhaskar, 1979/1998, p. 142, p. 178 note 23; the concept is adopted and modified from Mackie, 1974. 
The INUS-definition of causation appears to cover mainly efficient causes. In addition, there are material, 
formal and final causes that remain implicit in the concept of causal complex, which involves also internal 
relations, emergence, intentionality and processes with inherent logics of development. Final causes can 
be argued to be especially relevant for the social sciences (Kurki, 2008), although social structures typi-
cally exhibit formal causation. For an argument that teleological processes are also ubiquitous in nature, 
and for an application to IR theory, see Wendt, 2003.
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stitutions – are ubiquitous. The object of study is relational and historical. Causal anal-
ysis must focus on those entities and structures that possess real causal powers, and 
therefore are capable of producing effects, if triggered, across actual contexts. Causation 
must thus be specified in terms of a social ontology, explicating the kinds of parts we 
should be looking for. At any given moment, there is always a structured complex of 
intra- and interrelated entities, involving actors, intentional and meaningful actions, 
rules, resources, positioned practices and social systems (some of which are collective 
actors such as corporations or states). All these relational parts should be conceived as 
products of past and on-going processes (including at the most abstract level, Patomäki, 
2020a). They have particular characteristic ways – or dispositions – of acting and pro-
ducing effects. Thus, social scientists can spot tendencies, although they find no laws or 
even invariant regularities. Any outcome is typically co-determined by numerous pro-
cessual parts of causal complexes. Intra- and interdependence often results in emergent 
wholes that can be described as mechanisms or systems.
Although division of labour is often justified, ultimately there should be only one 
integrated social science whose multiple sub-branches study the tightly interlinked as-
pects of the social realm (just as different sub-branches of physical science study the 
tightly interlinked aspects of the physical realm). As Lawson (2015) argues, branches 
of science studying the same layer of reality are expected to employ a largely shared 
set of methodologies that will usually differ from the set of methodologies employed 
by branches studying a different layer. The outdated, and thoroughly discredited, idea 
that there is a single Scientific Method is clearly incompatible with this model of sci-
ence. Neither do naturalist attempts to import methodologies from the advanced phys-
ical sciences to the social sciences sit comfortably with Lawson’s view of the division of 
scientific labour. These sciences study largely different sorts of properties and powers. 
However, we do encourage open-ended learning from and together with the natural 
sciences. For instance, developments in the cognitive biosciences can be highly relevant 
for social inquiry, even if the former sciences will never provide a simple model for social 
researchers to emulate.
Epistemologically, we can also fruitfully draw from certain insights developed by 
pragmatists, such as Nicholas Rescher (1987, 1993, 2009). Throughout his work, Re-
scher has argued that there are two fundamentally different sorts of approaches to the 
cognitive enterprise – including scientific research. In his (somewhat idiosyncratic) ter-
minology, these approaches are called the ampliative and the reductive (see figure 2). In 
ampliative reasoning, the researcher starts with a presumably secure set of premises 
from which she then derives other equally safe propositions.
In the reductive approach, by contrast, the researcher starts with a set of ‘plausible 
acceptance candidates. She then seeks to purify the set by eliminating the invalid hy-
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potheses from the set or forging new syntheses between them. In other words, in the 
reductive approach the starting point is epistemic pluralism and the complex patterns 
and relationships of the real world (as in critical political economy); whereas in amplia-
tive research the goal is to get from a few simple, basic and apparently secure premises 






Figure 2: Ampliative and reductive approaches to scientific inquiry
The ampliative approach The reductive approach
Initial state Process Changed state
Source: Rescher 2007: 2
Figure 3: The structure of a dialectical process
Rescher (2009, p. 26) goes on to argue that these two contrasting approaches to inquiry 
call for different types of inference and argumentative strategies: ‘While the paradigm 
instrument of ampliative reasoning is deductive derivation, the paradigm method of 
contraction [the reductive approach] is dialectical argumentation’. The term ‘dialectics’ 
stresses the social and interactive nature of the research process. Dialectics has to do 
with disputation, debate, and rational controversy (Rescher, 2007). It answers the ques-
tion ‘how can we go about convincing one another?’. We can imagine most research as a 
social process in which one contender is defending a thesis (or a set of theses) in the face 
of objections and counterarguments made by an adversary in a situation where there 
can be disagreement about background assumptions as well (figure 3).
Source: modified from Rescher, 1987, pp. 33-4.
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Typically, the adversary doubts the thesis or tries to show that there are inherent weak-
nesses or contradictions in a set of relevant theses to which the defender is committed. 
The defender can respond by making new qualifications and distinctions, by complex-
ifying concepts and arguments, or by introducing new ones. In the process one then 
achieves an ever more refined picture of the world through continuing thesis revision, 
further distinctions and qualified syntheses (one can also abandon a thesis). There is 
no guarantee that this dialectical process will ever stop given the world’s great ability to 
surprise. New puzzles arise as the researcher digs deeper. The process is continuous and 
open-ended (see figure 3). A cyclical dialectical process consists of three stages:
• Initiation (positing, declaring, inauguring)
• Response (counter-reaction, reply, opposition, destabilization)
• Revision & readjustment (operational modification, sophistication, complexification)
Following this approach, the researcher first picks up an interesting research problem – 
usually an antinomy or aporia, involving contrastive questions and a plurality of (appar-
ently incompatible) claims about the world, all seen as interesting candidates for truth 
in their own right. She then decomposes the problem into its parts and goes on to build 
a conceptual, explanatory model about the relevant processual causal complex in its in-
ternal and external relations. These kinds of models are best understood as explanatory 
stories that make causal hypotheses explicit. Like a detective, the researcher evaluates 
existential and causal hypotheses in light of all relevant evidence, regardless of where it 
comes from and whether it is quantitative or qualitative, and in terms of conceptual and 
theoretical coherence, informativeness, realisticness, accuracy and explanatory power. 
As evidence increases and arguments mount, she proceeds by eliminating the hypoth-
eses that run into substantial problems and tries to reformulate and synthesise the rest 
of them in a coherent form. The overall combined explanation that stands up to the 
scrutiny – conceived as an iconic model, a descriptive and plausible picture of a possible 
world – can justifiably be taken as the provisionally correct and the most truth-like one 
but only until better ones are constructed (Patomäki 2002, 129–133; see also Harré & 
Rothbart 2004). This methodology involves ‘contrastive explanation’ (Garfinkel 1981; 
Lawson 1997; 2003; Morgan & Patomäki 2017; see also Kuorikoski & Ylikoski 2012 for 
an interesting discussion). 
The sort of realist and pragmatist ideas described here could equip IPE with enough 
of resources to overcome its current deadlock characterized by major philosophical 
shortcomings. Research can start with a practical explanandum or an empirically es-
tablished surprising contrast; but the starting point may also be a generic aporia that, 
while involving also empirical claims, may concern primarily a theory-oriented prob-
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lematic. We may thus learn through following different paths to knowledge at various 
levels of abstraction; yet in social scientific research studying historical open systems, 
these paths are tightly interwoven and mutually implicated.
A challenge for rational pluralist research is that different traditions are often not 
compatible in epistemological and ontological terms. Consider for instance the apparent 
similarity and obvious differences between the OEP and neo-Gramscian main expla-
nandum. Shared understanding could best be advanced by means of hermeneutically 
sensitive comparisons and syntheses of different approaches tailored for the purposes 
of concrete or more generalizable, theory-oriented explanatory efforts. Disorganized 
and fragmentary storytelling would thus give way for explicit hypotheses – including 
about adequate narrative forms – amenable to empirical examination and conceptual 
revision. Moreover, IPE could overcome its economic naïvety by engaging with econom-
ics in this spirit and following the methodological guidelines presented here. 
What could for instance the quantity theory of money mean in terms of social ontolo-
gy, in terms of actors, actions, rules, resources, positioned practices and social systems? 
It would have to be translated into the language of a realist ontology – or something 
equivalent such as the language of pragmatism – in order to provide meaningful hy-
potheses.26 This point applies equally well for example to post-Keynesian, neochartalist 
(or modern money theory, MMT), Marxian, and all other theories of money and in-
flation; as well as to claims about hegemony, social forces, regimes of accumulation, 
world order, structural power and so on. However, any specification of social ontology 
must always be subject to concrete historical research. Social ontology is not immune to 
historical change but rather an abstract model of the basic characteristics and powers 
of relational social being of a given geo-historical era (Patomäki 2020a). Conceived in 
these terms, a wide variety of approaches can provide interesting candidates for truth. 
Identification of such candidates, however, is only the beginning of a rational research 
process.
26 This translation from mere abstract quantitative variables into ontologically and causally meaning-
ful categories can draw on those accounts of the creation and circulation of money that come close to 
specifying actors, rules, resources and positioned practices and include: (1) intermediation of loanable 
funds – banks merely pool real savings as deposits and then lend these out; (2) bank money via the money 
multiplier – a deposit is made, a ‘reserve’ is retained and the rest is lent, ultimately becoming a deposit at 
another bank, which then becomes another reserve and loan and so on; (3) credit creation theory – banks 
make loans, loans become deposits, and every loan is a separate act of money creation. While (1) and (2) 
inform orthodox macroeconomics, including the quantity theory of money, (3) is probably closer to the 
prevailing central bank practices in the 2020s and is central to post-Keynesian economics (see e.g. Mar-
cuzzo, 2017). Together with the theory of state money, it also forms the core of MMT (see e.g. Wray, 2015; 
and for a criticism, Palley, 2019).
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OVERCOMING METHODOLOGICAL NATIONALISM
The validity of methodological nationalism depends partially on to what extent social 
systems in general can be closed or open. Sometimes this problematic is discussed in 
terms of ‘levels of analysis’ (for an early critique, see Patomäki 1996). Observing recent 
trends in IPE, especially in the US, Cohen (2017, p. 658) points out that ‘the pendulum 
has swung sharply toward the domestic level of analysis’. Hypotheses set out within 
the OEP framework are based on the assumption of essentially isolated or at least an-
alytically separable national systems. Many critical (political) economists share (some 
version of) this assumption. In other words, they presuppose that national systems are 
sufficiently closed from each other. In this context, assuming closure amounts, at least 
in effect, to methodological nationalism that subsumes societies under nation-states 
and presumes that national borders demarcate societies from each other (Beck, 2007). 
Research based on the assumptions of methodological nationalism, closure, and 
quantifiable variables tend to produce indeterminate results. Even when there is some 
agreement about the existence of a correlation between some variables in a given con-
text, explanations differ widely (Cohen, 2017). Ultimately, the problem is ontological. 
A claim about, say, particular domestic interests stemming from the positioning of a 
group of actors in relation to a particular economic process may well be insightful. Yet 
the articulation of interests is an open-ended geo-historical process that involves agency 
capable of both defining identities – who is the ‘we’ of collective interests? – and deter-
mining the meaning of the context. Moreover, global political economy constitutes a 
complex, dynamic mega-process, in which states and other actors are interwoven. One 
process can slide into another, and smaller processes combine to form larger ones. Enti-
ties such as states or domestic political actors are not only products and manifestations 
of processes, but they are themselves relational and this relationality is not confined 
to a ‘society’ defined by the borders of a state. The ‘reductionist gamble’ (Oatley, 2011) 
is therefore unlikely to result in any genuine illumination of real-world developments 
except in a context-bound, limited and unstable way. On this question, we seem to be in 
agreement with the new and complex interdependence approaches.
These kinds of general social-ontological claims must nonetheless be seen as open 
to various counterarguments grounded on empirical and historical research. For exam-
ple, some critical political economists (e.g. Garrett, 1998; Hirst, Thompson, & Bromley, 
2009; Slobodian, 2018; Weiss, 1998) and dissident economists (Mitchell & Fazi, 2017) 
have concluded that the extent and consequences of globalisation have been vastly ex-
aggerated and used in an ideological way. It is true that signs of globalisation in a techni-
cal sense have been used to obscure the dynamics that has led to the triumphant rise of 
globalisation as a specific political project. In the technical sense, globalisation refers to 
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the possibility that social relations can be maintained with increasing ease and intensity 
across time and space. As a dominant political project, however, (neoliberal) globali-
sation is primarily driven by a conviction that competitive, self-regulating markets, or 
their administrative simulation within organizations, are the best guarantees of effi-
ciency, freedom, justice, or all of these values. This project is about using international 
law and organizations to insulate the markets (in a manner that parallels the insulation 
of the neoclassical theory itself), and especially private corporations, against sovereign 
states, political change, and democratic demands for greater equality and social justice. 
In this spirit, several scholars, including the ones mentioned above, have focused on 
revealing ‘the myths’ of globalisation and exposing the ways in which they have been 
mobilised for specific political purposes. This critical project has taken a variety of in-
teresting forms. One approach is to look at recent historical developments and argue 
that there is in fact a variety of capitalisms that can be successful (Clark, 2016; Hall & 
Soskice, 2001). A parallel normative approach is to claim that we need ‘smart’ globali-
sation instead of hyper-globalisation (Rodrik, 2011). More generally, perhaps, the claim 
is that social democratic project can be resuscitated since the state seems more autono-
mous than what is usually thought, although the full realisation of its sovereignty may 
require institutional changes (e.g. exit from the euro). William Mitchell and Thomas 
Fazi’s (2017) variant of this idea relies on MMT and the idea of monetary sovereignty. If 
a state can finance its expenditures in its own floating currency, it faces no budget con-
straint in normal situations (but see note 22 above). States are sovereign, or at least they 
would be, if they just emancipated themselves, at least to a sufficient degree, from the 
‘self-imposed’ constraints now operating through various international organizations 
and legal arrangements.
In contrast to the methodologically nationalist OEP framework, within which public 
policy is explained in terms of largely given domestic interests and institutions, and 
society is assumed to be effectively confined by the borders of the nation-state, many 
critics of neoliberal globalisation (including the neo-Gramsians) have claimed that it is 
powerful transnational ideas, networks, international organizations and law that now 
determine public policy, thereby apparently concurring at least with aspects of new 
and complex interdependence approaches. What is perhaps surprising is that some 
other critics (such as Mitchell and Fazi) would like to transform the world to accord 
more with the assumptions of methodological nationalism. These antinomies replicate 
long-standing IR debates about the future of territorial state. For instance, John Herz 
(1957) argued famously that air power and nuclear weapons have made territorial states 
obsolete, but later (Herz 1968) reassessed his original thesis. William Connolly (1991) 
discusses Herz’s vacillations and related debates in political and IR theory in terms of 
nostalgia. Idealist nostalgia for territorial democracy fosters nostalgia for realist inter-
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national relations, and vice versa. Both stem from a nostalgia for ‘a time when a coher-
ent politics of ‘place’ could be imagined as a real possibility for the future’ (Connolly 
1991, p. 463). 
Connolly’s point clearly applies to many political economy critics of the globalization 
thesis. While OEP is narrowly seeking for positivist explanatory success in terms of its 
‘reductionist gamble’, its methodological nationalism, however imaginary, seems to ac-
cord with this nostalgia as well. OEP is premised on ideas such as (i) people of a territory 
maintain legitimate rule over themselves through electoral accountability, public dis-
cussions and lobbying and (ii) states maintain high degree of economic self-control and 
self-security enabling it to decide upon its own public policies and future. Whereas OEP 
assumes the world to be organised in accordance with these ideas, some of the critics of 
current neoliberal globalization, ironically, see them as ideals to be realised.
The ambiguities and aporias of these discussions indicate that they constitute sites 
for explanatory and theoretical explorations involving questions about materialism vs. 
idealism, actual vs. possible/ideal realities, and methodological nationalism vs. method-
ological globalism. Now, our contribution to this discussion is methodological. Claims 
originating in these kinds of debates (including those that maintain that globalization 
in its various guises and aspects is irreversibly transforming our world, such as Beck, 
2007, 2016; cf. discussions about deglobalisation in the early 2020s) can be seen as pos-
sible and interesting candidates for truth. They try to provide answers to questions in 
the form of ‘why (is it the case that) P in contrast to (other members of) X?’
We maintain that this kind of willingness to learn goes against dogmatic attachment 
to methodological nationalism arbitrarily restricting the set of possible hypotheses 
and arguments at the outset. A commitment to pluralism and open-mindedness rather 
seems to imply an endorsement of methodological globalism. This point has also termi-
nological consequences: as methodological globalists, we prefer to call the field Global 
Political Economy, or alternatively World Political Economy,27 rather than International 
Political Economy. 
Methodological globalism does not predetermine answers to normative questions 
about the best-justified and most adequate national and global responses to economic 
policy, regulations or global institutional arrangements. To give an example that may 
help by making this point more concrete, a recent study has found that the vast ma-
27 Whereas the term ’global’ means encompassing the whole spatial area of the Earth, the term ‘world’ is 
more flexible and can include also parts of the whole and subsystems, including states and their interac-
tions. Moreover, whereas the ‘global’ has a closed finite form in space (‘the Earth’, the ‘globe’), the ‘world’ 
presents a legacy of open and evolving complexity. Historically, the concept of ‘world’ is Germanic and 
finds its origins from ‘wer’ (‘who’) plus ‘alt’ (‘old’), i.e. the old German ‘weralt’ and ‘uueralt’, eventually re-
lated to a ‘creation of the world’. Thus, the concept of ‘world’ can be plausible seen as more temporal than 
spatial. The term World Political Economy is rarely used, however.
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jority of over 280 international trade and investment treaties restrict quite unduly the 
autonomy of states to responsibly regulate cross-border financial flows for stability and 
development (Gallagher, Sklar, & Thrasher, 2019). Adequate public governance of world 
economy through better common institutions (see e.g. Patomäki, 2018b, pp. 118-28) is 
not as such incompatible with increasing pluralism and even substantial autonomy of 
actors, including states. Quite to the contrary: these are issues that need to be explored 
and studied open-mindedly. The most adequate responses may often be complex and 
multilayered.
CONCLUSIONS
We have identified several preconditions for GPE to overcome its economic and philo-
sophical shortcomings and the present deadlock to which they have contributed. First, 
a relevant and adequate GPE would be conscious of, and reflective about, the econom-
ic-theoretical premises on which it builds. Such a GPE would bravely seek to account for 
economic problems and developments in a direct way. It would not be afraid of crossing 
disciplinary boundaries, even if that were occasionally to inflict hostile reactions from 
economists. However, in the face of such reactions GPE should not only teach, but also 
listen and learn. Never should it impose and colonize. 
Second, the prospects of fruitful cross-disciplinary engagement, let alone reunifica-
tion of economic theorisation and political economy on non-imperialist terms, is con-
tingent upon whether the former field would eventually be prepared to enter a balanced 
and mutual dialogue with the pluralist social sciences. Thus far, such a development 
has seemed unlikely. However, mainstream economics now faces novel challenges that 
might ultimately force it to adopt a more inclusive approach. Frameworks such as OEP 
notwithstanding, political economy in the sense developed in this paper is much broad-
er and more social scientific in its approach than the currently prevailing forms of eco-
nomics. What we would like to call the Helsinki approach to GPE is open to a variety 
of hypotheses derived from different traditions; its explananda cover a much broader 
domain than currently prevailing approaches, including for instance questions about 
peace, war and security (see e.g. Patomäki 2008; Patomäki 2020b); it engages with both 
agency and structure, and examines real-world dynamics. The point of research is ulti-
mately to contribute to the collective learning of humanity and openness improves one’s 
capacity for learning.
Third, cross-disciplinary dialogue aiming at sustained mutual learning is hardly 
possibly without (dis)solving positivist vs. postpositivist philosophical riddles by means 
of conceptual resources provided by critical social scientific realism, realist pragma-
tism and/or closely linked approaches. There is now an entire realist literature on the 
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philosophy of social sciences that can provide the intellectual resources needed for GPE 
and economics to eventually move beyond both ‘positivism’ and the equally antirealist 
reactions to it. We have proposed an approach that is grounded on realist (pragma-
tist) thought and an open-systemic understanding of causation. The basic aim of this 
approach is to respond to contradictions and aporias by means of dialectical scrutiny, 
aiming at better arguments about social systems. This is our favoured metatheoretical 
and processual basis for a new integrated approach.
Finally, political economy would need to become a ‘methodologically globalist’ field. 
As state borders have causal and constitutive effects, some structures and processes 
may in some sense be contained within the territories of single states. However, this 
definitely cannot be an a priori starting point of political economy research as such. 
Thus, we prefer to talk about GPE instead of IPE. As a specialised but broad field, GPE 
should be primarily concerned about those political and economic developments that 
do not stop at state borders, including all the grand global problems currently facing 
humanity, such as the immense risks associated with the Anthropocene. These chal-
lenges cannot be adequately addressed within the narrow constraints of a comparative 
and economistic framework presenting its nation-state-centric focus as a value-neutral 
choice. Shifting attention to genuinely global and normative topics, such as cosmopol-
itan democracy (see e.g. Patomäki & Teivainen, 2004; and Held & Patomäki, 2006), 
could be part of the remedy. 
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